The “Hot Potato” of Mental Health App Regulation: A Critical Case Study of the Australian Policy Arena by Parker, Lisa et al.
The “Hot Potato” of Mental Health App Regulation: A 
Critical Case Study of the Australian Policy Arena 
Lisa Parker1* ID , Lisa Bero1, Donna Gillies2, Melissa Raven3,4, Quinn Grundy5 
Abstract
Background: Health apps are a booming, yet under-regulated market, with potential consumer harms in privacy and 
health safety. Regulation of the health app market tends to be siloed, with no single sector holding comprehensive 
oversight. We sought to explore this phenomenon by critically analysing how the problem of health app regulation is 
being presented and addressed in the policy arena. 
Methods: We conducted a critical, qualitative case study of regulation of the Australian mental health app market. 
We purposively sampled influential policies from government, industry and non-profit organisations that provided 
oversight of app development, distribution or selection for use. We used Bacchi’s critical, theoretical approach to policy 
analysis, analysing policy solutions in relation to the ways the underlying problem was presented and discussed. We 
analysed the ways that policies characterised key stakeholder groups and the rationale policy authors provided for 
various mechanisms of health app oversight. 
Results: We identified and analysed 29 policies from Australia and beyond, spanning 5 sectors: medical device, 
privacy, advertising, finance, and digital content. Policy authors predominantly framed the problem as potential loss of 
commercial reputations and profits, rather than consumer protection. Policy solutions assigned main responsibility for 
app oversight to the public, with a heavy onus on consumers to select safe and high-quality apps. Commercial actors, 
including powerful app distributors and commercial third parties were rarely subjects of policy initiatives, despite having 
considerable power to affect app user outcomes.
Conclusion: A stronger regulatory focus on app distributors and commercial partners may improve consumer privacy 
and safety. Policy-makers in different sectors should work together to develop an overarching regulatory framework for 
health apps, with a focus on consumer protection.
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Implications for policy makers
• There are gaps in the regulatory framework for health apps, at least partly because the different sectors involved (medical device, advertising, 
finance, media content, privacy) are relatively siloed, with no single sector holding comprehensive oversight.
• There is a lack of regulatory focus on consumer protection for app users, with regulation instead concentrating on reducing burdens of consumer 
choice.
• Regulatory policies tend to ignore regulatory responsibilities of commercial app stores, which serve as distributers, even though the app stores 
arguably wield more power in the health app arena than policymakers and individual developers.
• Policy-makers in different sectors should work together to develop an overarching regulatory framework for health apps, with a focus on 
consumer protection.
• Governments should put pressure on commercial app stores to change practices in favour of protecting consumer privacy and safety.
Implications for the public
Consumers should be aware that the current regulatory framework is inadequate, meaning that some publicly available health apps may harm 
their health, finances or privacy.  Consumers and advocacy groups should lobby governments and industry for changes in legislation and industry 
practices that better supports consumer privacy and health safety.
Key Messages 
Introduction
In 2016, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) stated 
it did not intend to regulate mobile applications (apps) that 
focused only general health and wellness.1 The news was 
welcomed by the digital health industry, which promptly 
expressed its approval at being “free[d]…from rules that 
could potentially slow progress in the field,”2 explaining that 
“regulations…can be time-consuming and expensive.”3 Dr. 
James Madara, CEO of the American Medical Association, 
was more cautious, suggesting that oversight was needed to 
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reduce patient harm from the “scam[s]” and “digital snake oil” 
that currently exist within the “tsunami” of health apps.4,5 He 
agreed, however, that avoiding “heavy-handed” interference 
from government regulatory agencies in digital health was a 
good thing.5 A recent viewpoint by FDA leadership published 
in the Journal of the American Medical Association confirms 
this stance for the majority of health-related apps and signals 
their intention to harmonize regulations internationally.6
This recent policy development takes place in a time of 
rapid growth in the health app industry.7 There is enthusiasm 
among governments and clinicians about benefits, including 
improved self-care, prevention, enhanced accessibility, 
and cost-savings.7-10 However, there is also concern about 
the ability of health apps to collect, aggregate and share 
individuals’ data.11-13 Apps routinely, and legally, share de-
identified users’ data with an ‘ecosystem’ of companies 
that aggregate, analyse, and commercialise this data into 
algorithms and insights.14,15 However, studies have shown 
that data is easily re-identified and used for highly targeted 
advertising, causing psychological harm15 or used to make 
decisions about individuals’ employability, insurability 
and financial health, whether or not the underlying data is 
accurate or complete.14 Other concerns about health apps 
pertain to the lack of clear evidence of health benefits.16,17 The 
vast majority of mental health apps, for example, have not 
been formally tested,8,12,17 and for the few that have, scientific 
trials have been small, with short follow-up.18 This may mean 
health app users experience financial and other costs without 
any offset of benefit.8,12,17,18 Apps may also cause direct harm to 
health.13,19 For example, apps that encourage self-monitoring 
and/or sharing may lead to anxiety in users who cannot keep 
up with recommended activities or find their results compare 
unfavourably with others.20 
The explosion in the health app market has been 
accompanied by growing attention from policy-makers. 
Providing oversight is a demanding prospect for regulatory 
agencies given the emergent and rapidly changing nature 
of the industry, and the sheer volume of apps commercially 
available. Policy researchers have critiqued the current 
“patchwork”5 of regulatory oversight21 from medical device 
and privacy regulators and others. Many policies concentrate 
on what regulators do not intend to regulate. 
Despite the level of interest in health apps and both realised 
and potential consumer harms, this arena remains under-
regulated.13,22,23 We sought to understand this phenomenon 
by analysing how current policy solutions represented the 
problem of health app oversight. Further, we analyse the way 
policy authors characterise stakeholders within the health 
app policy arena, qualifying their degree of influence and 
responsibility.
Methods
This study was a critical, qualitative case study of the policy 
arena around the mental health app market in Australia, 
designed in partnership with a consumer advocacy 
organisation, which served to identify priority consumer 
concerns. We defined policy as a: “set of goals, objectives and 
means that create a framework for activity.”24 We expected 
policies would include legislation, industry self-regulation, 
and post-market certification or evaluation programs.25,26 For 
the purposes of this project, we term the entities publishing 
policy as ‘policy authors.’ 
We selected the oversight of mental health apps as a policy 
case study because mental health apps are particularly 
illustrative of regulatory issues pertaining to all health apps. 
We use the term ‘health app’ to mean software focused on 
health and/or wellness that is designed to be downloaded 
onto a smartphone, tablet computer, or other mobile platform 
and run with or without internet availability.27 Mental health 
apps address one or more of a wide range of concerns ranging 
from mental illness (such as major depression or anxiety) 
to mental wellness (such as mindfulness).28 Mental health 
apps are prominent within the health app market,29 with 
tens of thousands of different products available.30 They 
have also garnered significant attention amongst academics 
and clinicians.28,31,32 The World Health Organization (WHO) 
and governments around the world are promoting digital 
technologies, including apps, as an accessible and cost-
effective means of delivering mental healthcare.9,33-35 Mental 
health apps are subject to the same regulatory oversight as 
apps that focus on somatic health issues, however, while all 
health data is sensitive, mental health data is particularly 
so, highlighting the importance of mental health app user 
privacy.8 In addition, the wide ‘grey’ zone between mental 
health and illness highlights the difficulty of assessing the 
applicability of medical device regulation to many health 
apps.19,31
Theoretical Framework
This analysis was informed by Bacchi’s ‘What’s the 
Problem Represented to be?’36 approach. In conventional 
understandings of policy, policymakers are seen to react 
to social problems that exist beyond the policy process. 
However, Bacchi’s approach traces policy solutions back to 
the kinds of problems they purport to address. The problem 
is rarely stated explicitly in a policy document, but is implied 
by the proposed policy ‘solutions.’ According to Bacchi, 
the way policies represent problems plays an active part in 
shaping societal understanding about the nature of problems. 
For example, proposing additional education for health app 
developers about the law helps shape a societal understanding 
that the problem of oversight is one of knowledge deficit, 
whereas requiring submission of safety data to a medical 
device regulator identifies the problem as a risk of harm to 
health. We also used Bacchi’s concept of subjectification, 
which proposes that policies influence the ways stakeholders 
are seen by themselves and others and presumes that the 
effects of particular problem representations may create 
hardships for some social groups more than others. For 
example, a policy solution may attribute responsibility to a 
particular social group, with negative effects for members of 
that group, while assigning benefits to a social group with a 
more favourable social construction.
Sampling
Consistent with qualitative methodology, we purposively 
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sampled for influential policies during September-October 
2016 that addressed mental health app development, 
distribution, or selection for use, meaning that the sampling 
strategy was defined by a set of inclusion criteria specific to 
the context of the case study.37 We began sampling from the 
perspective of the Australian app market, which is one of the 
most concentrated smartphone markets in the world38 and 
a jurisdiction that is currently promoting the use of digital 
mental health services.39 However, the app market is global, as 
is the policy arena around health app oversight; thus, we also 
sampled policies from international jurisdictions that were 
referenced or relevant in the Australian context.
One investigator used the following sampling strategies to 
identify candidate policies for inclusion:
•	 Screening the websites of Australian government 
departments, industry trade associations, and mental 
health consumer organisations
•	 Medline and Google searches for policy literature 
using medical subject headings (MeSH) and keywords 
identified from relevant literature17,20,27,40: smartphone/cell 
phone/mobile applications/mobile phone/iPhone/mobile 
app/mobile health/mhealth AND mental disorders/
mental health/psychotic disorders/bipolar disorders/
schizophrenia/psychological stress/depression/depressive 
disorder/mood disorder/anxiety/anxiety disorder/mental 
illness/meditation/mindfulness/psychiatry AND health 
policy/policy/policy-making/public policy/framework/
regulation/politics 
•	 Hand searching through references and links in policies 
identified via steps 1 and 2; 
We validated our search strategy by sharing a list of candidate 
policies with our research partners, including representatives 
of a peak telecommunications consumer advocacy group and 
digital health policy experts. 
Two investigators independently screened the list of 
candidate policies for the following inclusion criteria: 
•	 Pertain to apps on a mobile platform
•	 Apply to apps that provide information, diagnosis, 
monitoring, treatment, or support related to mental 
health
•	 Be published by an active, prominent entity defined 
as: a government; major university, hospital or mental 
healthcare institution; multinational corporation; or a 
national organisation, including peak bodies, and not-
for-profit organisations
•	 Has an enforcement or inducement mechanism (such as 
a fine, exclusion from an industry body, or the ‘carrot’ of 
a quality certificate from a prominent entity)
•	 Clear evidence of implementation (eg, curated app 
libraries, promulgated legislation, active guidance) 
•	 Publication in the last 10 years
•	 Australian focus or a clear influence on the Australian 
context defined as publication by an Australian policy 
author, jurisdiction over the Australian app market, or 
reference by an Australian policy document.
We excluded policies that were not freely available in English. 
Discrepancies related to inclusion were resolved through 
discussion until consensus was reached. The resulting list of 
policies was again circulated to a peak telecommunications 
consumer body and digital health policy experts to validate 
that all relevant policies and policy authors had been included, 
who confirmed there were no major omissions.
Data Extraction and Analysis
We used the policies with associated websites and documents 
to source and record ancillary contextual information. This 
included: location and funding sources for the policy author 
(eg, government, non-profit, commercial); main role of the 
policy author; previous and related policies from the same 
author; policy author associates, informants, and target 
audience. We constructed an open-ended coding instrument 
to capture salient aspects within each policy, based on 
Bacchi’s policy theory.36 This included the target population 
and their subjectification, the ‘solution’ and implicitly defined 
‘problem’ provided within each policy, tacit suppositions and 
judgements about the topic of mental health app regulation, 
and likely effects of the policy. 
Each policy was read in detail and the first author wrote 
a preliminary memo that included a summary of the policy, 
contextual details, and definitions of unfamiliar terms. 
Researchers read the preliminary memo before coding 
the policy using the instrument described above and were 
instructed to iteratively incorporate contextual and related 
information where relevant. To enhance rigor, all policies 
and memos were reviewed by the senior author and a 
representative selection of policies were double coded. Any 
discrepancies were discussed, and resolved, erring on the 
side of comprehensive data interpretation. We presented 
preliminary interpretations to colleagues and policy partners, 
including an organisation representing consumers in the 
telecommunications industry and digital health policy experts 
and used these discussions to refine our findings.
Results 
We identified 29 policies, including guidance from 
government regulators, industry codes of conduct, and post-
market app evaluation programs, mostly from non-Australian 
locations (see references S1-S29 in Supplementary file 1). All 
but one pertained to health apps in general. Ten policies (34%) 
were authored in Australia or New Zealand; 11 in the United 
States (38%); 5 in Europe (17%) and 3 (10%) by international 
bodies. These policies corresponded to 5 principal sectors: 
medical device, privacy, advertising, finance, and digital 
media content.
A Framework for Policy Action
Based on our analysis, we devised a framework that describes 
the location of policy oversight in the health app field. 
According to our framework, any given policy shapes the app 
market at one or more different points along the trajectory, 
or ‘stream,’ of health app development and consumption, 
from inspiration, through development and distribution, 
to selection for use by consumers. We classified policies as 
‘upstream’ (eg, government guideline), ‘midstream’ (eg, app 
store guidance for developers), or ‘downstream’ (eg, quality 
certification or collated library of preferred apps) according 
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to their location along this trajectory (Table).
Each locus of oversight acts as a semi-permeable barrier, 
filtering the ‘stream’ of apps and sequentially reducing the size 
of the app market to which consumers are exposed (Figure 
1). The initial population of health apps is filtered through 
‘upstream’ government regulation resulting in the availability 
of legally acceptable apps. ‘Midstream’ policies such as industry 
self-regulation or app store criteria filter the legally acceptable 
apps leaving best practice apps. Finally, ‘downstream’ policies 
(including consumer education, external app certification, 
and app libraries) evaluate and curate the apps available in 
the market resulting in a small inner pool of ‘preferred apps.’
Oversight may be siloed and is not necessarily 
comprehensive. Different aspects of a single app may come 
under the jurisdiction of multiple upstream regulators, with 
none of them appearing to take overall responsibility for the 
product. For example, the US Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), which provides upstream protection for consumers’ 
interests in the marketplace, has produced a document 
providing “best practice” guidance to help health app 
developers “build privacy and security into [their] app” [S10a]. 
The FTC does not provide guidance on health app efficacy 
and safety, but directs those whose apps are “intended for 
use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the 
cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease” [S10b] 
to the FDA “to see if the FDA intends to apply its regulatory 
oversight for your type of app” [S10b]. 
Health apps that slip past upstream regulators may also 
fail to be captured by midstream regulators. For example, 
commercial app store guidance gives little attention to safety 
in health apps. The Google Play app store guidelines only 
alert developers that the store does not “allow … apps that 
feature medical or health-related functionalities that are 
misleading or potentially harmful”[S14](p9) while the Apple 
iTunes store guidelines simply state that “[m]edical apps that 
could provide inaccurate data or information, or that could be 
used for diagnosing or treating patients may be reviewed with 
greater scrutiny” [S13](1.4.1).
Downstream regulation is piecemeal and voluntary: 
developers and consumers may be unaware of it or may choose 
to ignore it. About half of the midstream and downstream 
policies had industry origins or partners and may better 
represent commercial interests. 
What Is the Nature of the Problem of Health App Regulation? 
The policies all provided a ‘solution,’ and thus implicitly 
represented a ‘problem,’ related to mental health app 
regulation.36 We identified a range of problem representations, 
with some more prominent than others, including: 
burdensome legislation, barriers to commercial success, and 
difficulty with consumer choice. Protection of consumers 
was, in comparison, represented to be a minor problem. 
Confusing and burdensome legislation was the dominant 
problem representation in several government policies (eg, 
[S5,S8,S11]). These policies sought to “provide [legislative] 
clarity to industry and [government] staff ” [S5](p1). Other 
policies represented the problem as the burden of regulatory 
compliance that fell upon industry, including associated 
financial costs [S11].
Many upstream policies and both midstream policies 
Table. Framework for Health App Policy
Type of Policy ‘Barrier’ Mechanism and Location of Oversight
Upstream
eg, government guideline
•	 Defines and oversees the pool of legally compliant apps  
•	 Enacted by legislators and implemented by regulators
•	 Includes legislation and regulatory guidance, which may not be legally binding but carry the influence of 
the regulator 
Midstream
eg, app store guidance for developers
•	 Defines the pool of apps that are commercially available to consumers
•	 Due to the smartphone market dominance of Apple and Google, in practice this includes the iTunes and 
Google Play app store guidelines
•	 Although compliance is voluntary, developers must submit their apps for review before they can be 
commercially distributed through these stores 
Downstream
eg, certification program for ‘high-
quality’ apps according to pre-defined 
criteria
•	 Seeks to identify high-quality apps on the market as a signal to consumers
•	 Achieves this through curation, endorsement, certification programs, or adherence to best practices 
•	 Compliance is voluntary and there are no formal consequences for non-compliance
Figure 1. Framework for Regulatory Influence.
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were aimed at commercial business interests, representing a 
problem of fragile commercial reputations:
“Don’t include any hidden or undocumented features in 
your app…We work hard to make the App Store a trustworthy 
ecosystem and expect our app developers to follow suit” 
[S13](2.3.1).
Other policies (eg, [S15, S10a]) represented legal as well as 
reputational business problems: 
“False or misleading claims, as well as the omission of 
certain important information, can tick off users and land 
you in legal hot water” [S9](p1).
Numerous downstream policies related to tools that 
consumers might use to identify particular apps, eg, curated 
app libraries, app certification programs, consumer guidance 
and education. These policy solutions implied or stated a 
problem of choice for consumers and health professionals: 
“with thousands of different mobile applications (apps) out 
there, trying to choose ones that are reliable and effective can 
be a daunting task” [S21].
Protecting app users was a less prominent issue within the 
policy sample, presented only in upstream policies. Three 
policies [S8,S15,S28] presented loss of privacy as a consumer 
protection (rather than a business protection) problem. 
These policies advised app developers to embed “better” 
[S15] (p1) privacy practices in their products in order to avoid 
inadvertently facilitating the loss of “significant amounts of 
personal [consumer] data” [S7](p5) that would result in “risks 
to the … reputation of users of smart devices” [S7](p2). No 
policies represented consumer health as problematic although 
one policy alluded to the possibility, noting “it is not yet clear 
if and to what extent lifestyle and wellbeing apps could pose a 
risk to citizens’ health” [S8]. This policy did not propose any 
related solutions.
Policy Subjects
Policy authors and subjects referenced in the sampled 
policies included: app developers, consumers, regulators, 
app distributors, representative bodies aligned with relevant 
industries (such as digital advertising and mobile privacy), 
app library curators (commercial or non-profit entities 
involved in selecting and presenting a ‘library’ of preferred 
apps) and additional commercial partners within the so-
called ‘mobile ecosystem’ (such as businesses offering tools on 
digital privacy). Within the policy sample, subjects tended to 
be ascribed responsibility for outcomes in inverse proportion 
to their influence over the health apps arena, such that the 
most commercially and politically powerful subjects (app 
distributors) were given less responsibility, while less powerful 
entities (consumers) were given the most responsibility 
(Figure 2).
App developers (also known as app manufacturers [S4] 
or publishers [S26a]) were often referred to as individuals, 
typically male. Developers were referenced as “small start-ups” 
[S7](p5) or “a large team of experienced programmers”[S13](p1).
They were generally presented positively:
“We. . . honor what you do. We’re really trying our best to 
create the best platform in the world for you to express your 
Figure 2. The Relative Power and Influence of Health Policy Target 
Populations.
talents” [S4] (p2).
At the same time, policies frequently referred to 
inexperienced, “first time app developer[s]”[S4](p1) who had 
“little or no prior programming skills” [S7](p5).
A minor, or “rogue” subjectification of the app developer 
was “dishonest,” [S13](p9) frowned upon for attempting to 
“cheat the system…or manipulate ratings,” [S13](p2) or “fleecing 
unsuspecting users” [S12] (p16) with “expensive apps that try 
to cheat users with irrationally high prices” [S12](p13) and for 
trying to “copy…or unfairly use other people’s work” [S14]
(p4). Incompetent developers who produced sub-standard apps 
were rejected for being likely to annoy “serious developers 
who don’t want their quality apps to be surrounded by amateur 
hour” [S13](p1). Policies promoted the idea that market forces 
would ensure rogue developers were in the minority: “Their 
ability to thrive is limited and they are therefore unlikely to 
cause widespread and systemic consumer harm” [S12](p40).
Clinical app developers were another sub-category. Policies 
presented these medical professionals positively as experts 
driven by ethical principles of beneficence and justice.
App consumers discussed within the policies included: 
patients, carers such as family and friends, and general 
citizens. Most policies described adults, sometimes 
specifically parents, occasionally children. Consumers were 
“confused,”[S18a] “unsuspecting” [S20a](p5) and “lack[ing] 
the ability to choose appropriate protection options,”[S11]
(p18) yet expected to “be smart about how and where you use 
your mobile device,”[S23] with the skills and understanding 
to “know what you are getting into before downloading,”[S50] 
and the wherewithal to “pay special attention to apps in which 
you enter personal information”[S20a]. They were often 
presented as irresponsible, “not tak[ing] the time to read” 
app privacy policies,[S26a](p7) Consumers were waiting for 
developers to tell them what they needed:
“Ensure that you communicate to the customer that a gap 
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exists [in their lives] and that your app can fill it” [S15f](6.1.2).
A secondary subjectification of app consumers was the 
“informed, discerning and influential consumer,” who had the 
power to generate “negative publicity” for the app developer if 
they lost confidence in the product [S6](p2).
Regulators appeared within policies as ineffective 
government agencies. For example, regulators described 
their policies as reactionary to “innovators [who] have begun 
to develop mobile apps of increasing complexity,” [S4](p6) 
positioning themselves as followers rather than leaders. They 
were unable to easily explain legislation to key stakeholders: 
“how [regulatory measures] are applied may not always be 
clear to consumers and industry participants” [S11](p15).
App distributers included Apple’s iTunes app store and 
Google’s Google Play store. Their subjectification was as 
“reputable provider[s]” [S23] of “trusted, high-quality…
content,”[S14](p33) providing benefit to consumers through the 
distribution of health apps.
App library curators used a range of tools to evaluate 
apps. Most used in-house checklists with health professionals 
conducting reviews. Curators portrayed themselves positively 
as “dedicated to consumers,” “committed,” and “free of 
preference or bias” [S22]. They were also useful to industry, 
creating space within their libraries for “a number of 
[advertising] opportunities for partners to…get their message 
out” [S20b].
Policies frequently referred to the mobile ecosystem, which 
included: app owners (if different from app developers); 
Operating System and mobile device manufacturers; mobile 
and internet providers; and entities involved in data collection 
and processing (often referred to as ‘third parties’) such as 
advertisers, brokers for aggregated data sets, and data analytics 
companies. The ecosystem was sometimes represented as 
useful, enabling app developers to see bigger profits via “new 
aggressive forms of ad delivery” that “create new options 
for monetization,” and provide consumers with “incredibly 
informative, relevant and delightful experiences” [S26a] (p19-
20). Others presented the ecosystem as untrustworthy elements 
within a connected industry whose “chain of mobile actors is 
only as strong as its weakest link” [S7](p2).
Responsibility for User Outcomes
Responsibility for user outcomes was allocated to stakeholders 
at odds with their ability to influence the health app market 
(Figure 1). Developers were assigned the most responsibility, 
while simultaneously acknowledged to be just one of multiple 
relevant elements. For example, “third-party services such as 
advertising are developing rapidly [and] if integrated by an app 
developer without due regard may disclose significant amounts 
of personal data” [emphasis added] [S7](p5).  Developers 
were told they “should be mindful of what ad providers they 
integrate into their applications: optimizing monetary return 
should not be the only consideration”[S26a](p20). Poor user 
outcomes were the responsibility of ill-informed developers 
who did “not fully understand[d] the implications” of the data 
collection and usage practices of their commercial partners. 
[S26a](p7).
Consumers were also accorded heavy responsibility for 
user outcomes. They were expected to take active steps to 
protect their privacy, for example by choosing apps wisely, 
[S21] reading privacy policies, [S20a] and securing their 
mobile device [S23]. However consumers were also expected 
to “share…progress with friends…or other users of the app 
community,” [S15a] in order to engender positive health 
behaviour change.
Governments and industry, including the commercially 
and politically powerful app stores, were accorded less 
responsibility for user outcomes; for example consumer 
protection policies (eg, stamping out overly predatory, 
coercive or inappropriate practices) were voluntary. Similarly, 
libraries were assigned no responsibility, despite having the 
potential to exercise substantial power over developers who 
wish to be included, and over consumers who use their 
recommended products. 
Discussion
Our results identified considerable policy activity related 
to oversight of health app development, distribution and 
selection for use. Gaps between oversight mechanisms were 
apparent, at least partly in response to upstream regulators 
shunting regulatory responsibility among themselves like 
a ‘hot potato’ that none wished to catch. The dominant 
regulatory concerns were to clarify and contain the reach 
of existing legislation, protect commercial reputations, and 
reduce the consumer burden of app selection. In comparison, 
there was less regulatory attention to consumer protection. 
Policies attributed responsibility for outcomes of app use to 
app developers and app consumers more than to governments 
and commercial entities including dominant app stores.
Existing upstream regulation is scattered throughout a 
range of separate sectors; oversight of each regulatory agency 
is limited, and some apps fall between legislative instruments. 
Developers may not be aware of all relevant regulations, and 
hence fail to adhere to their guidance. The most influential 
gatekeepers for the mental health app market are the midstream 
operators: multinational technology companies that operate 
dominant app stores. Other powerful stakeholders within 
the mobile ecosystem include commercial third parties that 
buy and process consumer data, whose business strategies 
inherently conflict with the protection of consumer privacy. 
Downstream regulation is limited, providing only a flimsy 
barrier to the flow of apps towards consumer selection, and 
much of it is commercially-backed, which poses a risk of 
sponsorship bias. 
Consumer interests may be advanced by health apps, but 
they may also be compromised.11,12,14,19 Despite these well-
described risks, consumer issues are not the main problem 
representation within health app policies. Instead, policies 
describe commercial problems for app developers and others. 
App developers were positively constructed, and afforded 
regulatory ‘carrots’ or cautionary tales rather than punitive 
measures. However, due to their limited influence over the 
health app market, a regulatory focus on app developers as the 
policy subjects of regulation is unlikely to afford widespread 
consumer protection. Instead, we identified large commercial 
actors in the health app market, namely the app stores, who 
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may be much more effective targets of regulation when it 
comes to oversight of health apps.
The limited regulatory attention to consumer protection 
is likely to have a multi-faceted explanation. The nature of 
health apps means there are multiple types of possible harm 
to consumers (eg, harms related to user health, privacy, 
finances, consumer rights). Since each of these is formally 
overseen by a different government agency, it is difficult to 
ascribe primary regulatory responsibility to a single body. 
Even in the United States, which has a legislative mandate for 
interagency cooperation41 there is no central regulator with 
overall accountability. Agencies may be wary of taking on a 
regulatory role if their responsibility is not clear, and the huge 
volume and constantly changing nature of health app products 
means that regulation of the entire field is simply beyond the 
capacity of traditional regulatory bodies. Underlying factors 
contributing to weak government regulation in this area 
may include strong lobbying from industry and long-term 
underfunding of government regulatory bodies.42
There was a notable lack of policy around health app 
efficacy, arguably an issue relevant to medical device 
regulators and consumer protection agencies. Medical device 
efficacy is important because devices are judged according 
to whether likely benefits outweigh harms. Medical device 
agencies are unlikely to play a major role in this issue. For 
example there has been no FDA enforcement action against 
health app developers since 2013,43 and their proscribed 
scope now excludes most health apps on the grounds that 
they are not devices and/or are low risk. A recent review of 
US regulation and case law related to mental health apps 
suggests that the potential for user harm will be the primary 
factor in determining the level of oversight; to date, there was 
no case law, however, specifically related to harms stemming 
from mental health apps.44 Health app efficacy may also be 
relevant to consumer protection agencies, because misleading 
claims of benefit contravene consumer marketing rights. The 
FTC has recently brought cases against 2 health apps on the 
grounds of misleading marketing. The cases were settled 
without a court judgment.44-46
Policy Recommendations
There is a growing literature acknowledging the current 
limitations of regulatory oversight for health apps, with a 
range of suggested approaches including stronger regulatory 
focus from governments22,42 and ongoing consumer education 
for technological literacy.13 Strengthening the position of 
upstream regulators will not only protect consumers but 
may also foster public confidence in the industry, enabling 
the market to expand and improve.22,29,42 We recommend 
further efforts to educate consumers about the risks of 
harm that health apps pose, with suggestions for safe health 
app use as part of technological literacy programs for app 
users and clinical prescribers.13 However, since consumers 
have relatively little opportunity to effect change on the 
overall app market, consumer-focussed solutions should 
not be the dominant consumer protection strategy. Support 
for consumer advocacy groups to lobby governments and 
industry for changes in legislation or industry practices may 
better support consumer interests. Similarly, instructing 
consumers to only choose high quality apps may be less useful 
than adopting better systems for external assessment of health 
app efficacy and quality.11
Regulators should concentrate on entities that have the most 
influence over the health app market, ie, app stores and other 
commercial partners within the mobile ecosystem. Currently 
midstream actors are able to effect significant influence 
over consumer experiences of health apps (eg, by setting 
standards for app content and for behaviour of commercial 
partners who collect and use consumer data.) However, the 
regulatory trajectory appears to favour well-established, major 
technology companies in reducing regulatory burden. The 
FDA has recently introduced a new Pre-Cert pilot program, 
which will allow selected companies, with a good track-
record for quality, to have expedited review of their medical 
device software, meaning their products can bypass many of 
the requirements of a full review.6,23 Although this field is in 
need of policy innovation and the Pre-Cert model may help 
to address the regulatory challenges associated with a large 
and rapidly iterating market, we suggest that more stringent 
standards for efficacy, safety, privacy, security, and marketing 
be imposed on the commercial app distributors and major 
app developers. We also advocate that the regulator maintain 
its independence from the industry it aims to regulate; the 
FDA’s dedicated Digital Health Unit in the medical device 
center will largely be funded by industry user fees,6 creating a 
conflict of interest, which is not necessarily in the best interests 
of consumers. Further, industry is implicated in undermining 
or shaping regulatory authority to its own advantage.42 For 
example, journalists revealed that Apple representatives have 
been secretly meeting with FDA officials for years, were 
invited to join the IMDRF working group, but requested their 
participation be omitted from public records.47 
One way to improve consumer protection would require 
a significant shift in regulatory focus: oversight of the 
developers, app stores, and third-parties involved in the 
commercialisation of consumer data. The General Data 
Protection Regulation in Europe represent an advance in 
transparency and accountability in regards to consumers’ 
privacy.48 However, we recommend systems be put in place 
to improve transparency over the collection and use of health 
app data, enable consumer correction of incorrect data, 
mandate reporting of adverse events, and enforce adherence 
to acceptable practices as occurred in the consumer credit 
industry in the United States.14 
Limitations
Our case study and purposive sampling approach means that 
our sample is not comprehensive nor representative of all 
policies related to health app regulation. This is particularly 
the case for policies derived from non-English speaking 
countries and any insights may not be generalizable to these 
jurisdictions. This is a rapidly moving field, and there may 
have been new policies released since sampling occurred. 
Nevertheless, our sampling strategy and policy sample was 
inclusive of a range of stakeholders and mechanisms across 
sectors and countries.
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Although our analysis was carried out with particular 
attention to the Australian mental health app market, our 
policy sample drew heavily from source material from other 
jurisdictions and entities with a global influence and few 
were specific to mental health. As a result, our findings are 
likely transferable to the regulation of health app markets 
internationally, particularly for other developed countries 
with similar regulatory landscapes.
Conclusion
Enthusiasm for health apps appears to be running ahead 
of oversight designed to protect the consumers who are 
encouraged to use them. This appears to be based on 
assumptions that they will deliver substantially more health 
and economic benefits than harms. These assumptions may 
be influenced by commercial bias; hence, we urge regulators 
and policy-makers to be mindful of the influence over 
consumer outcomes wielded by commercial entities in the 
health app market. We encourage consumer advocacy groups, 
app developers, health professionals and governments to work 
together, avoiding the ‘hot potato’ phenomenon which may 
create regulatory gaps, and prioritising a stronger regulatory 
focus on powerful commercial entities to improve consumer 
privacy and safety.
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